(1) is what we've been using in the South West Pacific with some degree of success and without alienating the population. But the cost has been high - the development of a cargo cult situation in which these states have steadily become more rather than less dependent, both economically and militarily. It has enormous dangers and in my opinion should only be used when the situation is desperate as it was in East Timor. While the left had urged military intevention there for nearly 20 years, the rest of the population only came round when things got too bad, because there was always a fear that war with Indonesia could cause that country to break up.
(2) was the general strategy that had been used, and it seemed pretty good as it had worked in most parts of the world and was seen as a low-cost minimum effort strategy which worked well in South Africa and the Cold War. However, it was failing spectacularly in the Middle East. In Iraq, the sanctions and thrice-weekly bombings seemed to be becoming cruel and making no little or impact (although we now know that the 1993-2003 bombing campaign was more effective than first assumed). [Also, the death rate attributed to war and sectarian violence still, inexplicably, remains below that attribted to sanctions.] But, as the Ethics profs drummed into us, inaction also has its cost and consequences. And in the wake of 9/11 and Bali, that was seen as too high. Now it turns out that the reaction of people in the Middle East when their government is corrupt or oppressive is to turn to Islam - and it will be because Islam is the root of their problems in the first place. So it turns out that (2) is actually as agressive as response a (1), because the West remains on the offensive economically, scientifically and culturally. So all we can expect from this approach is escalating violence and conflict, as the Middle East sinks into economic depression and in response into religious fundamentalism.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 11:41 pm (UTC)(2) was the general strategy that had been used, and it seemed pretty good as it had worked in most parts of the world and was seen as a low-cost minimum effort strategy which worked well in South Africa and the Cold War. However, it was failing spectacularly in the Middle East. In Iraq, the sanctions and thrice-weekly bombings seemed to be becoming cruel and making no little or impact (although we now know that the 1993-2003 bombing campaign was more effective than first assumed). [Also, the death rate attributed to war and sectarian violence still, inexplicably, remains below that attribted to sanctions.] But, as the Ethics profs drummed into us, inaction also has its cost and consequences. And in the wake of 9/11 and Bali, that was seen as too high. Now it turns out that the reaction of people in the Middle East when their government is corrupt or oppressive is to turn to Islam - and it will be because Islam is the root of their problems in the first place. So it turns out that (2) is actually as agressive as response a (1), because the West remains on the offensive economically, scientifically and culturally. So all we can expect from this approach is escalating violence and conflict, as the Middle East sinks into economic depression and in response into religious fundamentalism.
New strategy urgently required.